THE

"DECENT BURIAL" OF
LICENSEE ESTOPPEL

PATENT

In 1845 a patentee granted to licensees the right to manufacture
a machine for ginning cotton and wool and received in return a right
to a percentage of their profits. The licensees breached the contract
and claimed, as a justification, that the patent was invalid.' The
Supreme Court held that the licensees were estopped from asserting
this defense, 2 thereby establishing the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
In June 1969, the doctrine was repudiated in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. 3
This note will briefly explore the doctrine, the rationales offered to
support it, and the exceptions created to bypass it. An examination
will then follow of the Lear case and its possible influence on future
patent agreements.
Estoppel Priorto Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
Estoppel has most often arisen in two distinct but closely related
situations involving the transfer of patent rights-estoppel of an
assignor and estoppel of a licensee. 4 In the assignment of a patent
the inventor ostensibly transfers to the assignee all rights under his
patent, retaining nothing for himself save the right to receive
royalties.5 If after the assignment the inventor commences or
continues to manufacture the patented device, he presumably is
guilty of infringement, and his assignee is given a federal cause of
action against the inventor.' Numerous federal courts have held that
the inventor may not defend on the basis that his invention was
invalidly patented. 7 A patent license, however, is a transfer to
another of a limited right under the patent to manufacture, use, or
sell the patented device at a prescribed royalty, free from a claim of
infringement by the inventor. The inventor retains title to the patent
I. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).

2. Id. at 293.
3. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
4. Assignee and licensor estoppel cases have arisen less frequently. See, e.g., StubnitzGreene Spring Corp. v. Fort Pitt Bedding Co., 110 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1940) (licensor
estoppel); Brown v. L.V. Marks & Sons Co., 64 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ky. 1946) (assignee
estoppel).

5. See 4 A.

DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS

§ 335 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as

DELLER].

6. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Faulks v. Kemp, 3 F. 898 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
8. See 4 DELLER § 381.
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and may retain the right to manufacture, sell, or license the patent
to others. A patent license is a contract, and a cause of action
thereunder will normally arise under state law if the licensee breaches
by nonpayment of royalties.' In the past, courts have refused to
permit a licensee to assert the invalidity of the licensed patent when
he is sued for nonpayment of royalties. 0
Real property law served the courts well as a rationale for the
estoppel doctrine." A grantor conveying property by deed is
estopped from claiming any title inconsistent with the deed or from
denying a material fact in the deed.' Analogously, if one conveys a
potential right to exclude the public from an invention, he is
prevented from derogating from the transferred title by claiming
patent invalidity.' 3 Similarly, when a landlord leases property and
puts the tenant in possession, the latter is estopped to deny that the
landlord had good title in a suit for rent.' 4 Under the same rationale,
a licensee was prohibited from asserting patent invalidity in a suit
for royalties under a licensing agreement.' 5 But just as an evicted
tenant could contest the validity of the landlord's title in an action
for past rent," the courts held that a licensee could test the validity
of the patent in a suit for royalties where he showed an "eviction,"
such as a prior judgment of invalidity of the patent at issue. 7
By invoking the estoppel doctrine, courts have sought to prevent
unfair dealings between the parties. Thus in one case involving a
licensee's denial of the validity of his licensor's patent, the Court
held that after entering into the agreement and manufacturing under
9. Id. § 380.

10. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
11. See Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 IOWA L. REv. 525

(1967).
12. See 6 R. POWELL,

REAL PROPERTY

§ 937 (1969).

13. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 350
(1924).
14. See, e.g., Goode v. Gaines, 145 U.S. 141 (1892).
15. See, e.g., Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Headley Good Roads Co., 284 F. 177 (D. Del.
1922).
16. See, e.g., Merryman v. Bourne, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 592 (1869).
17. See, e.g., Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir, 1933).

The assignee of certain patents licensed the right to use the patents in the grocery trade to
licensee. Both the assignee and licensee joined in an infringement action against a third party,
and the court found that the patent was invalid. It was then held in a suit for royalties by the
assignee against the licensee that the previous judgment constituted the eviction, releasing the
licensee from his obligation to pay royalties. Id. See also White v. Lee, 14 F. 789 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1882).
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it, a strong presumption arose that the claim of patent invalidity was
made to avoid payment of the agreed upon royalties. 8 This rationale
was present also in the majority opinion by Justice Holmes in
United States v. Harvey Steel Co.," where it was found unjust to
allow the licensee to use the process introduced to him by the
patentee and permit him later to claim invalidity, thereby allowing
an escape from royalty payments.2 1 Similarly, in Faulks v. Kamp,2
when an assignor attempted to assert invalidity of the patent after
assignment, the Court in order to reach a just result, found an
implied warranty that the assignor had title to what he conveyed.2
Since they were primarily concerned with the equities of the
contracting parties, these Courts neglected the public policy
considerations inherent in the federal law of patents.
Several exceptions to the estoppel doctrine arose.2 3 As stated
previously, the-licensee was not estopped if he was "evicted." 2 4
Another exception permitted an assignor being sued by his assignee
for infringement to narrow the claims of the patent in question by
evidence tending to show the state of the art, so long as this
narrowing did not nullify the patent in an attempt to deny
infringement. The Supreme Court, in Westinghouse Electric &
Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,25 reasoned that if the
state of the art was not examined, courts would be deprived of the
best means of measuring what the patent included. 26
18. Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 488, 491-92 (1870). But see Handler,
Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 186-88 (1970).
19. 196 U.S. 310 (1905). The patent holder entered into a contract with the government
for the use of his patented process and later brought suit for royalties. The government
asserted invalidity as a defense even though there had been no prior determination of patent
invalidity.
20. Id. at 318-19.
21. 3 F. 898 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
22. "[i]n justice [assignors] ought not to be heard to say that they had it not and did not
sell it, and to be allowed to derogate from their own grant by setting up that it did not pass."
Id. at 904. St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184 (1890), is often cited to support
the same proposition, but in that case the lower court admitted evidence concerning the novelty
of the patent, and this admission was not held to be error by the Court.
23. See Cooper, Estoppel to Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good Faith
vs. PublicPolicy, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 1122, 1138-54 (1967).
24. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
25. 266 U.S. 342, 351 (1924).
26.
[But] the result proved to be an anomaly: if a patent had some novelty Formica
permitted the old owner to defend an infringement action by showing that the
invention's novel aspects did not extend to include the old owner's products; . . . if a
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Courts further limited the estoppel doctrine where counterveiling

public policy considerations warranted protection. In Sola Electric
Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.27 a licensing agreement stipulated that

the prices, terms, and conditions of sale throughout the licensed
territory should not be more favorable to the licensee's customers
than those set by the patentee. The patentee sought recovery of

unpaid royalties and an injunction to restrain subsequent sales not
made in accordance with the contract. The Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of estoppel was in conflict with the prohibitions against
price fixing of the Sherman Act and refused to apply estoppel since
the invalidity of the patent would necessarily render the agreement
illegal.2s Similarly, the Court has also held that it would be against
the policy of the patent laws to estop an assignor from asserting in
an infringement suit the defense that the assigned patent was a copy
of an expired one, since a patent becomes part of the public domain
upon its expiration.2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declined
to grant injunctive relief to enforce a contract wherein the licensee
agreed not to contest the validity of the patent, reasoning that the
public interest in eliminating worthless patents was as important as
the patentee's interest in protecting his monopoly." These numerous
patent had no novelty at all, the old owner could not defend successfully since he would
be obliged to launch the direct attack on the patent that Formica seemed to forbid.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 665 (1969).
But see Casco Prods. Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 116 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 693 (1940) (scope can be narrowed even if patent reduced to a nullity). See also Ball
& Socket Fastener Co. v. Ball Glove Fastening Co., 58 F. 818, 823 (1st Cir. 1893).
27. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
28. "Local rules of estoppel which would fasten upon the public as well as the petitioner
the burden of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act must yield to the Act's
declaration that such agreements are unlawful, and to the public policy of the Act which in
the public interest precludes the enforcement of such unlawful agreements." Id. at 177. See
also MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Edward Katzinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947). Here the licensors sought only to
collect royalties but the Court held that the existence of the price fixing clause was enough to
bring the validity of the patent into question.
29. See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). The assignee acquired
a patent from the assignor who later made use of the patent. As a defense to the assignee's
suit for infringement, the assignor asserted that the patent was a copy of an expired patent
and therefore a part of the public domain at the time he allegedly infringed. Interpreted
narrowly, the case establishes another exception to the doctrine of estoppel which arises when
the patent allegedly infringed was based on a prior-expired patent. Interpreted broadly,
however, the case could have been read to overrule estoppel in that all invalid patents are part
of the public domain, whether they are invalid because they are copies or otherwise. The same
policy that warranted another exception to the doctrine of estoppel also would seem to have
warranted repudiation of the doctrine.
30. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892). The patentee-plaintiff licensed
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exceptions had so eroded the estoppel doctrine that the next step,
complete repudiation, was a logical one. 31 Consequently, in Lear,
Inc. v. A dkinS32 the Supreme Court explicitly renounced the doctrine
of licensee estoppel.3
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins: The Court's Holding
In 1953, John Adkins, an employee of Lear, agreed to grant the
company a license on all ideas that he might develop during the term
of his employment on a mutually satisfactory royalty basis. In 1955,
he applied to the Patent Office for a patent on improvements on a
gyroscope and then entered into a detailed contract with Lear
concerning royalties. The contract could be terminated if the Patent
Office refused to grant a patent on the "substantial claims" of
Adkins' original application or if the patent issued but was
subsequently held invalid. After Adkins' application had been
rejected twice, Lear, believing that a patent would never be granted,
notified Adkins that it would no longer pay royalties on the
gyroscopes produced at Lear's Michigan plant. 34 In 1960, upon
narrowing his claims considerably, Adkins received a patent. After
two conflicting lower court determinations, 3 the California Supreme
his bicycle patent to the defendant on condition that he manufacture only certain types of
bicycles and that he agree not to challenge the validity of the plaintiff's patent. Alleging that
the licensee breached the latter provision, the patentee prayed for an accounting for the
machines made in violation of the agreement and for an injunction from further manufacture.
The licensee defended on the grounds of patent invalidity. See also Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
31. In 1947 Justice Frankfurter exclaimed: "If a doctrine that was vital law for more than
ninety years will be found to have now been deprived of life, we ought at least to give it decent
public burial." MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 416 (1947)
(dissenting). For an argument that the precedent to Lear did not point to the complete
repudiation of licensee estoppel see Dodds, After Lear ii. Adkins-lhat?, 51 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 621, 623-29 (1969).
32. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
33. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) was the
last express approval of the doctrine and was the specific case overruled in Lear.
34. Payments were continued for two more years on the gyros produced in Lear's
California plant, which were apparently closer in design to the device described in Adkins'
patent application, before Lear notified Adkins that it was terminating the agreement.
35. See Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1966). The trial court
directed a verdict of $16,000 for Adkins on the gyros manufactured in California, holding that
Lear was estopped by its licensing agreement from questioning the validity of the inventor's
patent. Because Lear claimed the Michigan gyros were developed independently of Adkins'
invention, the trial judge directed the jury to award the inventor a recovery only if it were
satisfied that the invention was novel within the meaning of the federal patent laws. The jury
returned an $888,000 verdict for Adkins, but Lear was granted judgment notwithstanding the
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Court held that the 1955 contract had not been properly terminated
and consequently the doctrine of estoppel barred Lear from
questioning the validity of the patent. 36 The state court also rejected
,Lear's contention that the Michigan gyros, as opposed to others
manufactured in California, were a natural extension of the prior art
and found at least partial reliance on Adkins' invention, whether or
not this invention met the standards required for the issuance of a
patent, and therefore reinstated the jury verdict below. 7
Since interpretation of specific provisions of the licensing
agreement was held to be uniquely a matter of state law the United
States Supreme Court considered only the state court's reliance on
the doctrine of estoppel which barred Lear from proving that the
patent was invalid." In deciding the estoppel question, the Court
first noted that past efforts to accommodate the common law of
contracts with federal patent law had failed.39 Analyzing the
"typical" licensing situation where a patent is licensed after issuance
rather than while the application is pending, 0 the Court found the
equities of the patentee-licensor to be weak when weighed against the
public's interest in the free access to ideas that are part of the public
domain.4 Thepublic right to the use of inventions not the subject
of valid patents had to be safeguarded in spite of traditional contract
law requirements. Since the licensee often is the only one with
sufficient economic incentive to contest the patent's validity, the
Court viewed him as the most appropriate person to champion the
public interest.42 The licensor would not be unduly burdened by
verdict on the basis that Adkins' invention had been completely anticipated by prior art. Both
sides appealed to the California Court of Appeals where it was held that Lear was within its
contractual rights in terminating the royalty obligations in 1959 and that if Adkins desired
to recover damages after that date he had to bring an infringement action in the federal courts.
The court held further that Lear had to pay pre-1959 royalties on both the Michigan and
California gyros under the contract regardless of the validity of the patent. Both parties again
appealed.
36. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
37. Id. at 907-15, 435 P.2d at 336-41, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 560-65.
38. 395 U.S. at 661-62.
39. Id. at 668.
40. Id. at 669-71.
41. Id. at 670-71. As used in this note "public domain" refers generally to those ideas in
which there are no protected private interests. It has been suggested that the Lear Court's use
of the phrase would not include ideas not generally known and that this use raised but did
not answer the issue of state law protection of unpatented secret ideas. See Adelman & Jaress,
Inventions and the Law of Trade Secretes After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 8283, 85 (1969); notes 84-106 infra and accompanying text.
42. 395 U.S. at 670. See also Brief for Petitioner at 36.
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allowing the licensee to contest validity, the Court reasoned, since
his case would be buttressed by the presumption that the Patent
Office's ex parte legal conclusion of patentability was correct. 3
Consequently, in order to enable the licensee to contest validity and
rid the public of worthless patents, the licensee estoppel doctrine was
overruled."
The Court then addressed itself to the particular fact situation
of the Lear case where the licensing agreement was consummated
four years prior to the granting of the patent.4 5 Adkins' claim to
royalties for the full patent term of 1960 to 1977 was rejected as
overbroad." Applying the policy of the patent laws despite the
limiting contract term, the claim to royalties until such time as the
patent was held invalid as required by the 1955 agreement was also
rejected by the Court.4 7 If the collection of royalties was allowed
until an adjudication of the patent's validity, the licensor would have
a strong economic incentive to use dilatory court tactics. Moreover,
use of such delaying tactics might deter licensees from challenging
patent validity and thereby protecting the public interest, especially
in an area where extended legal proceedings could last longer than
the actual useful life of a patent. The Lear decision thus makes it
clear that a licensee will be permitted to avoid royalties after the
issuance of the patent from the time he stops payment, provided he
49
is successful in proving patent invalidity.
Prior to Lear, any party with standing, other than the estopped
assignor or licensee, could contest the validity of a patent. 5 By
looking to the policy behind the patent and antitrust laws in order
43. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).

44. 395 U.S. at 671.
45. Id. at 671-75.

46. Id. at 672-73.
47. Id. at 673-74.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 674. The Lear decision is to be retroactively applied since "the public's interest
in the elimination of specious patents would be significantly prejudiced if the retroactive effect

of today's decision were limited in any way." Id. n. 19.
50. A party sued for patent infringement may raise the defense of invalidity. 35

U.S.C. § 282 (1964). Similarly, a party being threatened or charged with infringement by a
patentee may seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). See,
e.g., Welch v. Grindle, 251 F.2d 671- (9th Cir. 1957); Tuthill v. Wilsey, 182 F.2d 1006 (7th
Cir. 1950); E.J. Brooks Co. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 160 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); I-T-E
Circuit Breaker Co. v. McGraw Elec. Co., 121 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
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to enable the licensee 5' to contest validity, the Lear court reached a
desirable result. Federal legislation, especially the antitrust laws,
reflects an obvious disapproval of economic monopolies. 2 The
patent is an exception to this general rule made in order to encourage
inventors to disclose their ideas for public use and thereby promote
further invention by making the prior art accessible to prospective
inventors.53 In effect, the government is contracting with the patentee
to disclose his ideas to the public in return for a seventeen year
monopoly. However, this monopoly is sanctioned by the government
only if the inventor is benefiting the public with a truly novel
invention.51 If the Patent Office's ex parte determination is incorrect,
the patentee is granted an exclusive right to an invention when he is
not entitled to one-a monopoly that is against public policy-and
this exclusive right must be defeated. By enabling another litigant,
frequently the one with the strongest economic incentive, to contest
patent validity, the public will more effectively be rid of these
unnecessary monopolies.
When the validity of the patent is questionable, it is in the
licensee's interest, as well as that of the public, to force litigation by
stopping royalty payments and subjecting himself to suit by the
licensor, for, if successful, the licensee would be freed from further
royalties,55 and the public would be relieved of the burden of an
invalid patent. If the licensee is unsuccessful, he would normally be
liable only for the royalties he was already obligated to pay under
the contract. However, there are sufficient factors to deter the
licensee from forcing needless litigation by withholding royalties
when he does not have a sound basis for asserting invalidity. The
litigation expense may be great enough to assure that only truly
doubtful patents will be challenged.56 Further, where a frivolous
51. Although Lear's facts are restricted to the licensing situation, an assignor will probably
now be permitted to contest validity as well. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
52. See W. BALLARD, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 1-12 (1947). See generally Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
53. See L. AMDUR, PXTENT FUNDAMENTALS 51-52 (1948); W. BALLARD, supra note 52, at
12-13; L. WooD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 15-16 (1942); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN THE EXPLOITATION OF
PATENTS I (Comm. Print 1956).
54. L. AMDUR, supra note 53, at 51-52; 1 DELLER § 31 (1964); J. NORMAN, PATENTS 18
(1853). There are other situations such as the misuse of patent power where the patent
monopoly will not be sanctioned by the courts. See, e.g., B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S.
495 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
55. 395 U.S. at 674.
56. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative
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attempt to escape royalties is shown, the Court may award the
licensor reasonable attorney's fees. 57 Moreover, although a breach of

the covenant to pay royalties usually is not grounds for cancellation
of the license, 58 if the breach defeats the whole consideration of the

agreement, as when the licensee not only stops paying royalties but
also ceases manufacture under the license, the agreement may be

terminated by the licensor.59 In such a case, if the patent were valid,
the licensee would presumably remain liable for royalties incurred

prior to the cessation, and any further attempt to manufacture the
article may subject the licensee to an infringement suit. 0
Consequently, although the licensee has ample incentive to contest

the validity of the patent in that he may avoid further royalty
payments, there is sufficient deterrence to inhibit him from bringing

bad faith claims when there is no real question of validity."'
Lear holds that the obligation to pay royalties ends when the

licensee stops paying royalties after the issuance of the patent if the
patent is subsequently invalidated.12 Further, although the facts of
Lear are confined to a licensing agreement, in view of the Court's

compilation of assignment as well as licensing cases in developing
its argument, the same policy will require that estoppel be repudiated

in the assignment context.63 There are, however, several important
Law, 55 HARv. L. Rav. 950, 957, 969 (1942); Note, Gratuitous Findings of Validity: A
Judicial Gift to Patentees,61 YALE L.J. 98, 103 (1952).
57. This remedy is to be used sparingly. See Union Nat'l Bank v. Superior Steel Corp., 9
F.R.D. 117 (W.D. Pa. 1949). But when unjustified litigation is clearly shown, the remedy is
available. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 215 (D. Md),
affd, 185 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1950).
58.
It will not do to say that a forfeiture has taken place, ipso facto, by the non-payment
of the stipulated royalties, and that, therefore, all handling of the patented articles by
the defendant since then has been an infringement. The law does not arm one party to
a contract with the power to determine in his own favor a condition of [that] kind
* * **Even where the contract provides that the failure to pay shall render it null and
void, the defendant has a right to be heard as to the facts upon which such annulment
is made to depend. Standard Dental Mfg. Co. v. National Tooth Co., 95 F. 291, 294
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1899).
See also White v. Lee, 3 F. 222 (C.C.D. Mass. 1880).
59. See, e.g., Oscar Barnett Foundry Co. v. Crowe, 219 F. 450 (3d Cir. 1915); Ruby v.
Ebsary Gypsum Co., 36 F.2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 1929).
60. Once the license is terminated the licensee has no further patent protection. See 4
DELLER

§ 411.

61. Besides being so protected from bad faith claims of invalidity, the licensor will benefit
if his patent withstands the rigors of an adversary proceeding, for the contest holding it valid
will strengthen the patent by making further contests of validity less likely.
62. 395 U.S. at 674.
63. Id. at 663-68.
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questions left unanswered by the opinion. May the parties avoid the
Lear result by a consent judgment?"' If payments are made after the
patent is issued and before the suit contesting validity is commenced,
can the licensee recoup these past royalty payments?"5 Does federal
patent policy bar enforcement of a contract regulating access to an
unpatented or patent-pending secret idea?66
Can the PartiesA void Lear by a Consent Judgment?
The public policy voiced in Lear supports the "full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain.1"67 Since this policy was frustrated by a judiciallycreated doctrine barring the licensee from the defense of patent
invalidity, the doctrine was judicially repudiated." Although the
remainder of the license may still be enforceable,69 a contract clause
similarly prohibiting the defense of invalidity would also be void as
against public policy and therefore unenforceable." However, does
incorporation of the agreement in a consent judgment alter this
64. See notes 67-79 infra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 84-106 infra and accompanying text.
67. 395 U.S. at 670.
68. Id. at 670-71.
69. Generally, contracts in conflict with public policy are illegal or void. See, e.g., KaiserFrazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952); Kalos
v. Saliaris, 116 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1940); Coyne v. Superior Incinerator Co., 80 F.2d 844 (2d
Cir. 1936). However, if an agreement based on legal consideration contains several promises,
and the illegal promise may be separated, the remainder of the contract will be enforceable.
See, e.g., Brown v. R.&R. Engineering Co., 264 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1959); Kosuga v. Kelly,
257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1958), affd, 353 U.S. 516 (1959).
70. See Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947). Here the Court stated
that a contract clause not to challenge the validity of the licensor's patent could "no more
overrule Congressional policy than [could] . . .an implied estoppel." Id. at 401-02, Cf Pope
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233-36 (1892). Although not explicitly reaching the
question, the Lear Court pointed toward the same result. When faced with the question of
whether Lear would be required to pay royalties during the time in which the patent was being
challenged, the Court refused to enforce the portion of the license agreement which provided
that royalties were due until the determination of patent invalidity. The Court stated that
[tihe parties' contract . ..is no more controlling on this issue than is the State's
doctrine of estoppel which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive question
is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could
be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent
validity in the courts. 395 U.S. at 673.
On the theory that this provision would significantly frustrate overriding federal policies, the
Court declined to enforce it. The same federal policies would seem to warrant the Court's
refusal to enforce a contract provision disabling the licensee from contesting the patent's
validity.
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result? In other words, if the licensor brings an infringement suit"l
against the prospective licensee, or the licensee seeks a declaratory
judgment 2 of invalidity, in each case the validity of the patent being

upholding
at issue, and the licensee promptly consents to a judgment
73
the patent's validity, should the judgment be res judicata?

Res judicata is based on the public policy of putting an end to
litigation, 74 but this policy gives way if there is an overriding policy
that must be honored.7 5 There must therefore be a balancing:" On

one side is the policy of finalizing litigation and on the other is the
public interest in permitting patent monoplies only when based on

valid patents. When the judgment merely incorporates an agreement
between the parties without an adversary determination of patent

validity,77 this latter policy will be frustrated by giving the consent
judgement res judicata effect just as it was frustrated by licensee
estoppel or by a contract provision prohibiting the licensee from

contesting validity.
In weighing these policies, the Second Circuit has afforded more

protection to the public interest involved in the removal of the
unwarranted monopoly accorded an invalid patent.78 It has held that
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
73. For a discussion of consent judgments as res judicata, see Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 514

(1946).
74. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 1,comment a (1942).
75. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); United States
v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Kalb v. Feverstein, 308 U.S. 506 (1940);
Keokuk & W.R.R. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301 (1894); In re Di Carlo's Estate, 3 Cal. 2d 225,
44 P.2d 562 (1935); People ex rel Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co. v. Burke,
72 Colo. 486, 212 P. 837 (1923). See also cases collected at Annot., 88 L. Ed. 389, 390 (1944).
76. See, e.g., Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946);
Pierson v. Pierson, 15 N.J. Misc. 117, 189 A. 391 (Ch. 1937). See generally Annot., 2
A.L.R.2d 514, 532 (1946).
77. Cf. Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1948) (consent judgment
not res judicata in tort action where court in first suit performed merely the administrative
function of recording the parties' agreement).
78. See Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1946).
[O]n grounds of public policy . . . in a decree entered by consent, either an
adjudication of infringement, or a grant of some relief from which infringement may
be inferred, is essential before any effect of res judicata can be given to it on the issue
of validity . . . . [W]e think the public interest in a judicial determination of the
invalidity of a worthless patent is great enough to warrant the conclusion that a
defendant is not estopped by a decree of validity, at least when this decree was by
consent, unless it is clear that in the litigation resulting in the decree this issue of
validity was genuine. Id. at 485.
But see Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1969), where the court
upheld the prior consent judgment but did not consider public policy in reaching its result.
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when a prior adjudication of validity has been made through a
consent decree, the defendant is not estopped by the decree unless it
is clear that genuine litigation was involved in the original
proceeding.79 Such an approach would seem consistent with the
emphasis placed on the public interest in Lear. Indeed, to do
otherwise would allow the Lear result to be avoided by ignoring the
very interests it sought to protect.
May a Licensee Recoup Royalties Paid After the Issuance of the
Patent and Priorto the Suit for Royalties?

Although a licensee could not contest validity prior to Lear, an
alleged infringer, or a third party with standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action, could assert patent invalidity. 0 If the
patent was held invalid in this third party suit, the licensee was
normally freed from further royalty payments, since the
consideration flowing to the licensee failed once the patent was
proved invalid. However, prior to the holding of invalidity, the
contract was supported by sufficient consideration: freedom from an
infringement suit and deterrence of competitors. Therefore, no
recoupment of past royalties was allowed. This rationale should
apply no matter who proves patent invalidity and effectuates the
eviction. Lear merely expanded the class that may prove invalidity
and therefore should not change the disallowance of recovery of past
royalties.
Moreover, the policy behind Lear would be more effectively
promoted by disallowing recoupment. The Lear Court enabled the
licensee to contest validity in order to rid the public of needless
patents.8 3 By denying recoupment the Court would not inhibit the
licensee but would put pressure on him to test the patent's validity
as soon as he has a sound basis for so doing, for until the suit is
brought the licensee would be obligated to pay royalties under the
79. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1946).
80. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir. 1933). See
also White v. Lee, 14 F. 789 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882), where the court stated that in a suit for
royalties, "a plea or answer that the patent is void, is not, of itself, a sufficient defense, but
that evidence of what may be called an eviction is such a defense." Id. at 791 (emphasis
added). With no "eviction" the defense of invalidity is not available so royalties must be
continued. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir. 1933).
83. 395 U.S. at 670-71.
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contract. Recoupment of past royalties should therefore be
disallowed because a contract supported by sufficient consideration
would be enforced until its consideration failed and the Lear policy
would be promoted.
Does Federal Patent Policy Bar Enforcement of a Contract
Regulating Access to an Unpatented or Patent PendingSecret Idea?
Justice Black, concurring and dissenting in Lear, agreed with the
holding of the Court but stated that it should have gone. one step
further and held that licenses based on unpatentable or patent
pending inventions that are later deemed unpatentable could not be
enforced. 4 In order to understand the issues involved in this
question, a brief discussion of the patent system's relationship to the
law of trade secrets is in order.
The paramount purpose of the federal patent law is "[tlo
promote the progress of science . . . . , To meet this objective
Congress has offered the inventor a seventeen year monopoly, an
exception to the antitrust laws, in exchange for disclosure of his
invention.8" The inventor is free to keep his idea secret,8 7 but if he
does so, the right to exclude others from his invention is limited to
that protection afforded him by the law of trade secrets.88 An
important objective of trade secret law is to protect the inventor's
discovery from fraudulent disclosure. 8 He has a right to prohibit
84.
[N]o State has a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be a
new invention, except when a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office under
the exacting standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery may, of course,
keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled "inventors"
do not keep their discoveries secret but rather disclose them, in return for contractual
payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate the kind
of inventions that may be protected . . . .The national policy expressed in the patent
laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated
by private agreements. . . .395 U.S. at 676-77.
The majority opinion raised the issue but expressly reserved judgment for a future case. Id.
at 674-75; see Adelman & Jaress, supra note 41, at 78.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.8.
86. See L. AMDUR, supra note 53, at 52.
87. Id.
88. The inventor may contract with the person to whom he discloses his invention not to
disclose it to others and sue under the contract upon breach. See 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE SECRETS §§ 3.01-.05 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM]. In the
absence of a contract, he is protected by operation of law. See id. §§ 4.01 -.03.
89. See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by FederalPatent and Antitrust
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those to whom he confidentially discloses his invention from
revealing and independently using it, but he cannot exclude anyone
who independently develops the device through research or by
examination of the manufactured product."' This limited protection
is based on nondisclosure in contrast to the required disclosure of
the patent laws, for once the invention is no longer secret, the
protection ends.' Consequently, although both state trade secret law
and federal patent law promote invention, there is a conflict: Public
disclosure of the invention terminates trade secret protection, while
public disclosure is required to obtain patent protection.
Despite the conflict, patent and trade secret law should generally
co-exist, except in the situation of the "potentially perpetual secret"
where disclosure may not occur within the period protected by the
patent laws. 2 Congress did not intend that its patent legislation be
preemptive. 3 Disclosure in return for a monopoly is the means to
meet the objective of promoting science on the theory that access to
other inventions will spur further discovery.9 Trade secret protection
also presumably promotes invention. If an investor knew that after
successfully developing his invention he would have no protection
against one who fraudulently copies the device and manufactures it
without the burden of development costs, the inventor would be
discouraged from further efforts. Moreover trade secret law only
temporarily conflicts with the means which Congress has chosen to
promote invention through the patent laws, for whether the inventor
Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. Rgv. 1432, 1435-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Doerfer]. See also
Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 161, 186-87 (1970).
90. See MILGRIM § 5.041].
91. Id. at § 2.03. See also Doerfer 1434-35.
92. Adelman and Jaress describe "potentially perpetual secrets" as being "usually process

inventions where an examination of the resulting product does not disclose the method of
manufacture, or chemical formulations whose composition cannot be analyzed." Adelman &
Jaress, supra note 41, at 92. A patent will not be issued when the invention is put to public
use for more than a year prior to the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964).

Therefore, it has been suggested that state trade secret law protection of "potentially perpetual
secrets" should be limited to the one year period. Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal PreEmption-The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 713, 729-32 (1967). It

might be suggested, however, that the decisional standards of what constitutes a "potentially
perpetual secret" will involve both state and federal courts in impossible technicalities and

may lead to the abandonment of trade secret law. Alternatively, it may be argued that these
"potentially perpetual secrets" rarely ripen into perpetual secrets and should be tolerated

without the abandonment of trade secret law. Cf. Doerfer 1448.
93. See Note, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 956,

964-66 (1968).
94. See Doerfer 1440-41.
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relies exclusively on trade secret protection or whether he uses it only
during the patent pending period, the conflict will soon be resolved:
Disclosure will usually be accomplished in the former situation by
commercialization" and in the latter by the issuance of the patent.
When an inventor licenses his invention but relies exclusively on
trade secret protection, or relies on such protection while his patent
application is pending, would enforcement of his contract frustrate
the policy of the patent and antitrust laws? The refusal of the Lear
Court to answer that question precipitated the concurrence by
Justice Black.96 He argued that enforcement of a contract calling for
royalties on the invention while a patent is pending would indeed
frustrate federal policies if the invention is later deemed
unpatentable, and that by enforcing such agreements the state was
illegitimately creating a monopoly. 7 To support his proposition he
cited Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.9" and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting Co.99 in which an Illinois unfair competition law
prohibiting a manufacturer from copying an unpatentable device was
held to be preempted by the federal patent law. While it is true that
the state's action in denying an independent manufacturer the
opportunity to copy an unpatentable article by its unfair competition
law-thereby granting an exclusive right to an invention to the
inventor though he did not have a patent-must be overturned, it
does not follow that all licenses of unpatentable or patent pending
inventions are unenforceable.
gy enforcing a contract based on an unpatented or patent
pending invention, state law is not creating a monopoly in
contravention of the patent laws since the licensee, under the
common law of trade secrets, does not ,acquire the protection of the
patent laws or its equivalent. Trade secret law provides that if a
95. See Adelman & Jaress, supra note 41, at 91-92. The exception to this position, however,
is the "potentially perpetual secret." See note 92 supra and accompanying text.

96. 395 U.S. at 676-77. The majority of the Court held that the state court had not
satisfactorily passed on the issue as yet so it decided to reserve the question for later

determination. Id. at 674-75. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, reasoned that the Court
should not pass on the issue since: (1) if the patent were determined valid on remand, the issue
would be moot, (2) if the patent were held invalid and the state had a chance to pass on the
issue it might accommodate federal and state law so as to dispense with the need for further
review, and (3) the parties had not briefed or prepared the issue adequately. Id. at 682.

97. Id. at 677.
98. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).

99. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). For a recent discussion of Sears, Compco, and related trade secret
decisions, see Adelman & Jaress, supra note 41, at 80-84.
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member of the public develops the same device through independent
research, such person is not prohibited from exploiting it.' °° If a
member of the public can, under these circumstances, exploit the
invention there is no monopoly, and the contract should be
enforced. 01 Moreover, by enforcing such contracts, the courts would
be furthering the policy of the federal patent laws-promotion of
invention-for there is a greater economic incentive for an inventor
to produce when he is assured that his discovery, even if not
patentable, may be licensed for profit. There is a need for such
incentive, foi unpatentable, as well as patentable inventions,
"promote the progress of science," and the former do not involve
the grant of a legal monopoly.
Though not creating a monopoly, it is possible that state law
enforcement of these licenses may create an unreasonable restraint
of trade. 02 If the restrictive convenants are not too broad0 " and are
necessary to accomplish a legitimate business purpose it is unlikely
that there will be antitrust problems.' A covenant not to disclose
the invention qualifies as a necessary restriction" 5 since once the
invention is disclosed, trade secret protection terminates and the
underlying discovery becomes accessible to the public in general.
Moreover, despite the disclosure restriction, unpatented and patent
pending licenses promote invention by giving the inventor a "head
start" toward recouping research and development costs. 10
Although there may be some restraint on trade by the disclosure
100. See MILGRIM § 5.0411].
101. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)
(quoting Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953)). An
Illinois law of unfair competition gave the holders of the trade secrets in Stiffel and Compco

the power "to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be
patented ....
" Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964). When
the holder of the trade secret does not have this power to exclude competitors from his secret
at will, no monopoly results.
102. See R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 57(c) (3d ed. 1968).
103. For an example of an agreement that was held to be too broad, see United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affd. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
104. See R. CALLMANN, supra note 102, at § 57(c).

105. "[S]o far as these contracts limit the communication of what the [inventor] might have
refrained from communicating to anyone, there is no monopoly . . . and no contract in
restraint of trade, either under the [Sherman Act] or at common law." Board of Trade v.
Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 252 (1905). But see Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 15-16 n.14 (1945).
106. See 395 U.S. at 682 n.2 (White, J., concurring); Adelman & Jaress, supra note 41, at
88-91; Doerfer 1451.
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restriction, this minimal restraint should not be held to be
unreasonable since the restraint is necessary to effectuate a licensing
agreement in furtherance of a legitimate business -purpose which
promotes invention.
Therefore, trade secret law, in general, and licenses of unpatented
and patent pending inventions in particular, stimulate invention, the
primary purpose of the patent law, and this stimulation outweighs
the non-disclosure and minimal restraints on trade brought about by
trade secret law and licensing agreements under its sole protection.
Consequently, the Lear holding should not be extended as proposed
by Justice Black, but patent and trade secret law should co-exist
through enforcement of non-patent and patent pending licenses.
CONCLUSION

Lear broadly represents an attempt to strictly circumscribe the
existence of lawful patent monopolies. The legal right to invalidate
a patent has been given to the party with the greatest economic
interest in its elimination. The licensee who has developed a
sophisticated marketing system and can absorb the costs of litigation
will not hesitate to challenge voidable patents, because he can
immediately realize a profit free of royalty costs. This incentive of
economic self-interest should not be frustrated through devices such
as consent judgments or by royalty recoupment; otherwise
"the public . . . [will] continually be required to pay tribute
to would-be monopolists without need or justification.' '0 7 Nevertheless, post-Lear patent policy should not bar the enforcement
of contracts regulating access to unpatented or patent pending secret
ideas and thereby lead to the demise of state trade secret law.
107. 395 U.S. at 670.

